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SKYYWALKER RECORDS, INC. V. NAVARRO: "ENOUGH
ALREADY" TO THE OBSCENE RESULTS OF
MILLER V. CALIFORNIA
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me per-
fectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises ... and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition .... But
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
- Justice Holmes'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro2 ("Skyywalker Records"),
the Southern District Court of Florida found the rap music' group 2 Live
Crew's recording As Nasty As They Wanna Be legally obscene.' The
court began the opinion with the observation that "[t]his is a case be-
tween two ancient enemies: Anything Goes and Enough Already."' In
this case, "Anything Goes" advocates arguably broad protection of the
first amendment rights of freedom of speech and expression.6 The con-
cept loses to "Enough Already," which advocates judicial constraints on
those rights such as the United States Supreme Court's current construc-
tion of the obscenity doctrine, the Miller v. California7 ("Miller") test.'
1. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by
Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
3. Rap music is "popular music featuring a rhyming patter of urban slang intoned over a
steady and insistent beat." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1191 (1989 ed.).
4. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 596 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
5. Id. at 582.
6. See id. at 582, 586.
7. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). For a discussion of the Miller test, see infra notes 83-111 and
accompanying text.
8. See Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 582, 586-87.
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However, there is a problem with denying first amendment rights
through "Enough Alreadies" such as Miller.
For a work to be deemed obscene under Miller, it must be proved
that the work appeals to the prurient interest, depicts sexual conduct in a
patently offensive manner, and is without serious social value.9 This sets
out an elusive and elastic standard that can vary from case to case as
often as individual tastes and opinions vary.'0 The vague standard en-
courages faulty applications by courts." For example, in Skyywalker
Records, the court used its own "knowledge" of the relevant community
standard in order to meet two of the three prongs of the Miller test.' 2
Further, regardless of how a given court applies Miller, the test itself
seems to violate the Supreme Court's constructions of the first amend-
ment. The Court has recognized that when a legal doctrine is so vague as
to be undefinable, as are the elements of Miller, the doctrine is unconsti-
tutional because citizens are not able to predict what conduct may be
illegal.' 3 Legitimate speech is also "chilled" for fear of meeting the
test."4 These vagueness problems are particularly acute when a court
attempts to decide if a work has serious value.' 5 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has affirmed two first amendment theories which appear to contra-
dict Miller or any such obscenity test. Both the recognized right to re-
ceive and possess obscene speech, 6 and the right to protection of
inexpressible emotions 7 seem to preclude a Miller inquiry.
This note examines the vagueness problems intrinsic to the Miller
test in the context of the Skyywalker Records decision and also discusses
the basic unconstitutionality of any obscenity doctrine, absent evidence
of exposure to young children or unconsenting adults.
9. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
10. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 511 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
11. Paris, 413 U.S. at 84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 590 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
13. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
14. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
15. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 511 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
16. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
17. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
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II. FACTS
A. Procedural Background
The four members of the rap music group 2 Live Crew18 and its
record company, Skyywalker Records, filed a civil action against Brow-
ard County, Florida Sheriff Nicholas Navarro, after he had warned rec-
ord retailers in Broward County to remove the group's recording, As
Nasty As They Wanna Be ("Nasty"), from the shelves because the re-
cording was obscene. 9 The plaintiffs brought the action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that the Sheriff had infringed upon the group's first
amendment right to freedom of speech because the seizure was an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint2° of the recording.2" The plaintiffs also sought
judicial determination under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) of whether the Nasty
recording is legally obscene and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2202(b).22
The district court held that the Sheriff's actions were an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint,23 but the court also concluded that the recording
was legally obscene. 24 The court emphasized that because this was a civil
action, the decision did not criminalize 2 Live Crew's conduct nor charge
anyone with a crime.25 Under the decision, however, individuals who
sell, distribute, produce, or knowingly possess the recording may be pros-
ecuted under a Florida state law.26 The law sets a maximum penalty of
five years in jail and a $5,000 fine for selling "harmful material" to mi-
nors and a maximum penalty of one year in jail and a $1,000 fine for sales
to adults.27 No criminal proceedings against either the recording or 2
18. Luther Campbell, Mark Ross, David Hobbs, and Chris Wongwon. Skyywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
19. Id. at 582-83.
20. The first amendment of the Constitution prohibits the restraint on a publication before
it is published. A person defamed is left to a libel remedy. A prohibited prior restraint is not
limited to the suppression of material before it is released to the public; rather, an invalid prior
restraint is an infringement upon the constitutional right to disseminate matters that are ordi-
narily protected by the first amendment without there first being a judicial determination that
the material does not qualify for first amendment protection. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1074-75 (5th ed. 1979).
21. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 582.
22. Id.
23. The court correctly held that the seizure was unconstitutional. Id. at 603. This issue
is not addressed in this note.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 582.
26. See infra note 40 for a description of section 847.011 of the Florida Statutes.
27. Ent. L. Rep., July, 1990, Vol. 12, No. 2, at 19. On October 3, 1990, a Ft. Lauderdale,
Florida record store owner, Charles Freeman, became the first person to be convicted of the
misdemeanor of selling the Nasty recording to an adult. L.A. Times, Oct. 4, 1990, § A, at 1,
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Live Crew have yet been instituted in Florida based on Nasty's
obscenity.28
B. Case History
2 Live Crew released Nasty to the public in 1989.29 The record-
ing contains numerous expletives and much sexually explicit language.30
To date, sales of Nasty have totalled over two million copies.3" 2 Live
Crew includes a statement on the front of the paper insert to their re-
cording which reads: "WARNING: EXPLICIT LANGUAGE CON-
TAINED.13 2 The group has also produced a recording entitled As Clean
As They Wanna Be, which contains the same music as Nasty but "with-
out . . . explicit sexual lyrics," 3  and which has sold approximately
250,000 copies.3 4
In February, 1990, in response to complaints by South Florida resi-
dents," the Broward County Sheriff's Office began an investigation of
col. 4; L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1990, § F, at 7, col. 1. Freeman was subsequently fined $1,000.
Freeman has refused to pay the fine and has said he will appeal the decision. L.A. Times, Dec.
13, 1990, § F, at 1, col. 4.
28. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 584 (S.D. Fla. 1990). On
March 27, 1990, Navarro filed an in rem proceeding in the Broward County Circuit Court
against the Nasty recording seeking a judicial determination that it was obscene under state
law. Id. at 583. See Navarro v. The Recording "As Nasty As They Wanna Be," case number
90-09324(12) (Reasbeck). At the time the Skyywalker Records opinion was published, a trial
date had not yet been set. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 583-84. The members of 2
Live Crew, however, were tried and acquitted in a jury trial on October 20, 1990 of charges of
violating Florida obscenity laws during a June 10, 1990, Hollywood, Florida nightclub per-
formance, in which the group performed songs from Nasty. L.A. Times, Oct. 21, 1990, § A, at
1, col. 4.
29. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 582.
30. The court did not list any lyrics from the Nasty recording nor indicate which specific
lyrics were considered in its decision. The court found, however, that the lyrics and titles of
songs on the Nasty recording were replete with references to genitalia, excretion, oral-anal
contact, fellatio, sexual intercourse, group sex, sadomasochism, other sexual activities, and
sounds of moaning. Id. at 591. Use of musical lyrics in general which focus on these subjects,
presented in a context such as the Nasty recording, appears to be what the court found
obscene.
31. L.A. Times, Oct. 4, 1990, § A, at 19, col. I.
32. Skyywalker Records 739 F. Supp. at 583.
33. Id. at 582.
34. Id.
35. Id. Under cross-examination, the Broward County Deputy Sheriff who conducted the
investigation of Nasty, Mark Wichner, conceded that his department had not received any
complaints from Broward County residents. Nat'l L.J., June 4, 1990, at 27, col. 4. There were
no written complaints in the Nasty investigation file created by the Broward County Sheriff's
Office. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 589.
The opinion notes, however, the existence of complaints, "whether communicated by tele-
phone calls, anonymous messages, or letters to the police," which demonstrated the "signifi-
cant community discontent" prompting the investigation. Id. The court further found that
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the Nasty recording.36  On February 26, 1990, the Deputy Sheriff as-
signed to the case, Mark Wichner, purchased a cassette recording of
Nasty at a Broward County retail music store, Sound Warehouse.37
Wichner listened to the Nasty recording, had six of the eighteen songs
transcribed, and prepared an affidavit detailing these facts. 38 On Febru-
ary 28, 1990, Wichner submitted these materials and the Nasty tape cas-
sette to the Broward County Circuit Court and requested that the court
find probable cause that the Nasty recording was legally obscene.39 The
circuit court subsequently found probable cause to believe the recording
was obscene and issued an order of this finding.'
The Broward County Sheriff's Office distributed the court's order to
any retail stores that might be selling the Nasty recording.4 Addition-
ally, Wichner and other members of the Sheriff's Office visited fifteen to
twenty stores and warned retailers that subsequent sale of the Nasty re-
cording could result in their arrest and conviction.42 Within days, all
retail stores in Broward County ceased offering the Nasty recording for
sale.4 3 Those stores not directly visited by the Sheriff's Office pulled the
recording from their shelves after learning of the Sheriff's visits from
television and radio reports." Despite 2 Live Crew's own warning label
on the recording, Nasty was no longer available even in stores which had
policies of specially marking the recording with a warning and of refus-
ing sales to minors.45 At the time the Skyywalker Records decision was
"the vast majority of complaints in the file, although not exclusively from Broward County,
were residents of the relevant community." Id. For purposes of the Miller test, the court
concluded that the relevant community was not just Broward County, as both parties had
assumed, but nearby Palm Beach and Dade counties as well. The court based this conclusion
on the three counties' geographic, economic, and transportation ties. Id. at 587-88. Thus,
under Wichner's testimony, the "significant community discontent" which prompted seizure
of the recording in Broward County must have been based only upon unwritten complaints
from outside of Broward County.
36. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
37. Id. at 583.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The circuit court found Nasty obscene under section 847.011 of the Florida Stat-
utes and under case law. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 583 (S.D.
Fla. 1990). Subsection (1)(a) of section 847.011 criminalizes the distribution, sale, or produc-
tion of any obscene thing including a "recording" which can be "transmuted into auditory...
representations." Subsection (2) similarly makes it a crime for a person to knowingly have an
obscene thing in his possession. Id. at 585.
41. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 583.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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published, the Sheriff's Office had taken no further action because there
was no information that any store was selling the Nasty recording.46
The seizure of the Nasty recording in Broward County was not the
first attempt in Florida to suppress 2 Live Crew's music.47 A Lee
County, Florida judge had ruled as early as October, 1988 that probable
cause existed to believe that 2 Live Crew's Move Somethin' recording was
obscene. 48 However, the obscenity controversy did not reach full mo-
mentum until Republican Governor Bob Martinez - citing a concern
that minors had access to the music - asked statewide prosecutor Peter
Antonacci in February, 1990 to determine whether 2 Live Crew's music
violated the state obscenity or federal racketeering statutes.49 The Gov-
ernor's interest had been prompted by Jack Thompson, a Coral Gables,
Florida lawyer and self-styled crusader against pornography who had
launched a letter-faxing campaign to law-enforcement officials through-
out Florida, urging them to take action against Nasty. "o Prosecutor An-
tonacci advised Governor Martinez that the issue could be best handled
at the local level, and the circuit court issued its probable cause determi-
nation against Nasty three days later."
Although Governor Martinez's concern that Nasty was available to
children prompted the events leading to the recording's suppression in
Broward County, Nasty's impact on minors was not considered in the
present case because there was insufficient evidence that Nasty was either
targeted at, or had reached, children. 2 Additionally, there was no indi-
cation in the court's opinion that unconsenting adults were unwillingly
exposed to the recording.53 Thus, the Skyywalker Records court decided
only that Nasty is unsuitable for exposure to consenting adults.54
III. THE RISE IN ANTI-OBSCENITY PROSECUTIONS
The Skyywalker Records trial and a February, 1990 criminal trial in
Alabama,55 in which a record retailer was acquitted after a jury trial for
selling 2 Live Crew's Move Somethin' recording, are believed to be the
46. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 583 (S.D. Fla. 1990). But see
supra note 27.
47. See Nat'l L.J., June 4, 1990, at 27, col. 4.
48. Id.
49. Id. For a discussion of the use of the federal racketeering statute in obscenity prosecu-
tions, see infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
50. Gilmore, The Year in Music, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 13-27, 1990, at 16.
51. Nat'l L.J., June 4, 1990, at 27, col. 4.
52. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 589 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
53. See id. at 582-96.
54. See id.
55. City of Alexander v. Hammond, CC-88-69. Nat'l L.J., June 4, 1990, at 27, col. 2.
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first two music obscenity trials.56 Legal experts see the extension of the
obscenity doctrine to music as part of a boom in anti-obscenity prosecu-
tions that has taken place across the country.5 7 For example, obscenity
prosecutions conducted by the Department of Justice rose from 37 in
1988 to 120 in 1989.58 Many observers attribute the rise in such anti-
obscenity activity to politicians who seek to benefit from the current con-
servative public sentiment. 59
A further development is the use of the far-reaching federal anti-
racketeering law, the 1970 Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act ("RICO").' RICO has been used to fuel cases against music
and arts targets.61 There is increasing speculation among legal experts
and entertainment industry observers that the controversy involving sex-
ually explicit lyrics in popular music may soon escalate because the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation and the United States Justice Department
are pressing the use of RICO in obscenity cases. 62 Although the RICO
statute has yet to be used to prosecute a record store owner or record
56. Nat'l L.J., June 4, 1990, at 1, col. 2. However, prosecution of allegedly obscene music
probably has just begun. Local grand juries, judges, and prosecutors in Florida, Georgia,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee have declared that several rap recordings may be obscene. Id. at
27, col. 1. The Charles Freeman prosecution, see supra note 27, triggered a series of similar
prosecutions against record store owners who refused to stop selling the Nasty recording in
Texas, North Carolina, and Canada. L.A. Times, Dec. 13, 1990, § F, at 11, col. 5. Commer-
cial obscenity charges brought against a San Antonio, Texas record store owner were dis-
missed on December 10, 1990. Id. Counts filed against the 142-store Dallas-based Sound
Warehouse (the same record store chain involved in Skyywalker Records, Skyywalker Records,
Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 583 (S.D. Fla. 1990)) were dismissed on November 8, 1990.
L.A. Times, Dec. 13, 1990, § F, at 11, col. 5. Obscenity cases against retailers who sold Nasty
in North Carolina and Canada are not expected to go to trial before early 1991. Id.
57. Nat'l L.J., June 4, 1990, at 1, col. 2. For instance, restrictions placed on federally
funded arts projects containing sexually explicit material have been the focus of heated Con-
gressional debates on budgeting for the National Endowment for the Arts. Id. In April, 1990,
Cincinnati officials indicted the city's Contemporary Arts Center and its director for an exhibit
of works by photographer Robert Mapplethorpe that contained sexually explicit material. Id.
at 27, col. 1; L.A. Times, Oct. 4, 1990, § A, at 19, col. 1. The Center and its director were
subsequently acquitted. L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1990, § F, at 1, col. 4.
58. Nat'l L.J., June 4, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
59. Id. at 27, col. 1. For example, a national satellite network featuring hard and soft core
pornography recently closed down after its producer and distributors were indicted by an Ala-
bama county district attorney who was running for state attorney general. Id.
60. RICO was originally intended to be a tool "against the Mafia and other organized
crime by targeting 'enterprises' that engage in a 'pattern of racketeering activity.' " L.A.
Times, Nov. 1, 1990, § F, at 6, col. 1. The law, however, has also been used against targets as
diverse as the Teamsters Union, former Drexel Burnham Lambert junk bond king Michael
Milken, and the late Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos. Id.
61. Id. at 1, col. 4.
62. Id. For example, the FBI recently staged obscenity raids on the home of a San Fran-
cisco photographer and on 30 Southern California adult video manufacturers and distributors.
No charges have yet been filed. Id.
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company, it played a key role in the Skyywalker Records case. 63 Obscen-
ity crusader Jack Thompson's attempt to persuade Florida Governor
Bob Martinez to investigate 2 Live Crew for possible violations of RICO,
in addition to Florida obscenity statutes, ignited the events which led to
the Skyywalker Records decision."
A RICO conviction carries a twenty-year prison term for each rack-
eteering count and can force defendants to forfeit their entire interest in
an enterprise, even if only a fraction of the earnings came from illegal
activities. 65 RICO allows for both civil and criminal prosecution, and a
defendant establishes a pattern of illegal acts sufficient to constitute rack-
eteering if he commits two offenses within a ten year period.66 As
Thompson himself stated, "[a]ll the law requires [for a RICO prosecu-
tion] is that you sell two units of obscene material. [2 Live Crew] has
sold 2 million."
67
IV. BACKGROUND: THE OBSCENITY DOCTRINE
A. Overview
The first amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech."' 68  In the
landmark case of Roth v. United States,69 ("Roth") the United States
Supreme Court held that obscenity is not within the area of constitution-
ally protected freedom of speech or press - either under the first amend-
ment, applied to the federal government, or under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, applied to the states.70 The Court found
63. L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1990, § F, at 6, col. 3.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 6, col. 1. On October 15, 1990, the Supreme Court let stand the racketeering
conviction of a Virginia couple that included seizure of the couple's three adult bookstores and
nine rental shops, for selling $105 worth of obscene material. Id. at 6, col. 2. See United States
v. Pryba, 88-5001. Nat'l L.J., June 4, 1990, at 28, col. 4.
66. L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1990, § F, at 6, col. 1.
67. Id. at 6, col. 4.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth published and sold books, photographs, and magazines in
New York. He used circulars and advertising to solicit sales. Roth was convicted of mailing
obscene circulars and advertisements, and an obscene book, in violation of the federal obscen-
ity statute. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 480 (1957). The Supreme Court upheld the
conviction. Id. at 494. The Roth test of obscenity was whether, to the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest. Id. at 489.
70. Id. at 481-85. The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall... deprive
any person of... liberty ... without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. It is well
established that "liberty" includes the right to free speech. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1942).
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that the unconditional phrasing of the first amendment that no law may
abridge freedom of speech was not intended to protect every utterance.7 1
The Court further reasoned that implicit in the history of the first
amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming so-
cial importance.72
The rationale behind the obscenity doctrine is that the message con-
veyed by obscene speech is of such slight social value that it is out-
weighed by compelling interests of society, as manifested in laws enacted
by legislatures.73 In a companion case to Miller v. California 74 decided
the same day, 75 the Court offered three reasons why society could sup-
press the obscene rather than merely protect the right of people to avoid
it if they wished: (1) there is at least an arguable correlation between
obscene speech and crime; (2) states have the power to make a morally
neutral judgment that obscene material injures the community as a whole
by polluting the public environment; and (3) what is commonly read,
seen, heard, and done intrudes upon us all, whether it is wanted or not.7 6
B. Miller v. California
1. The Miller Decision
The Supreme Court heard Miller v. California as one of a group of
obscenity-pornography cases in an effort to re-examine the existing ob-
scenity standards.77 In Miller, the appellant conducted a mass mailing
71. Roth, 354 U.S. at 483. The Court has delineated a number of areas in addition to
obscenity which are not afforded first amendment protection, including defamation, "fighting
words," and types of commercial speech. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-
2, at 790 n.10, § 12-10, at 850 (2d ed. 1988).
72. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
73. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 587, 584 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
74. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
75. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
76. Id. at 58-59, 68-69. Of course, each of these justifications is based upon arguable fac-
tual predicates. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969) (a state law could
not be defended on the ground that "exposure to obscene materials may lead to deviant sexual
behavior or crimes of sexual violence," for
[t]here appears to be little empirical basis for that assertion .... [W]e should adhere
to the view that "[a]mong free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent
crime are education and punishment for violations of the law".... Given the pres-
ent state of knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene
matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit
possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture
of homemade spirits.
(citation omitted)); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 510-11 (1957) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
77. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973). The controlling obscenity test at the time
Miller was decided was set out in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), although it
1991]
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campaign to advertise illustrated adult books.7" The appellant mailed
five unsolicited advertising brochures to a restaurant in Newport Beach,
California.79 He was subsequently convicted of mailing unsolicited sexu-
ally explicit advertisements, in violation of a California statute.80 The
Court noted that the case involved application of a state obscenity statute
in a situation where "sexually explicit materials have been thrust by ag-
gressive sales action upon unwilling recipients who had in no way indi-
cated any desire to receive such materials."8 The Court vacated and
remanded the case for further proceedings under its new test. 82
2. The Miller Test
In Miller, the Court developed the current test for determining
whether a given work is obscene.83 The Court held that to find material
obscene, the basic guidelines for the trier of fact are:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.8 4
In adopting Miller, the Court built on the Roth definition,85 yet also
resolved some additional issues.86 First, the Court rejected the require-
ment of the prior Memoirs v. Massachusetts7 ("Memoirs") test that the
work be "utterly without redeeming social value."88 Miller broadens the
had largely been abandoned by the Court. Miller, 413 U.S. at 21-23. In Memoirm a plurality
of only three justices held that a work was obscene if (1) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex, (2) the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or represen-
tation of sexual matters, and (3) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418.
78. Miller, 413 U.S. at 16.
79. Id. at 18.
80. Id. at 16. Appellant violated California Penal Code section 311.2(a), a misdemeanor,
by knowingly distributing obscene matter. (Cal. Amended Stats. 1969). Id. at 16-17 & 16 n. 1.
81. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
82. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973).
83. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 587 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
84. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted).
85. Miller reaffirmed RotI. Id. at 36.
86. Id. at 24-32.
87. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
88. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (quoting Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966)) (emphasis omitted).
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scope of what is termed obscene to include not only works "utterly"
without social value, but also works which do not have "serious" liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.8 9 Second, in adopting the con-
temporary community standards measure, the Miller Court rejected the
prior notion that prurient interest and patent offensiveness should be de-
termined by a national standard.' The Court stated that the first
amendment does not require that "the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New
York City."'" Third, the Court held that states may ban only depictions
or descriptions of "hard core"92 sexual conduct.93 Further, this conduct
must be specifically defined by state law, as written or construed, in order
to "provide [the first amendment requirement of] fair notice to a dealer
in such materials that his public and commercial activities may bring
prosecution." 94
3. Explanation of the Miller Test
For a work to be deemed obscene, all three elements of the Miller
test must be met and each element must be " 'independently' evalu-
ated." 95 The first two elements, appeal to the prurient interest and pat-
ent offensiveness, are judged by contemporary community standards.
96
The community is made up of all adults in the geographic area, including
the most sensitive, 97 but the court may not focus on "the most prudish or
the most tolerant,"9' or "the reactions of a sensitive or of a callous
minority."'99
For material to appeal to the prurient interest, the material at issue
must exhibit a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excre-
89. Id. at 24.
90. Id. at 30.
91. Id. at 32.
92. The Court did not define hard core obscenity, other than to offer possible model state
statutes defining sexual conduct. The Miller Court gave two examples of the type of conduct
subject to state regulation: "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." Id. at
25.
93. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
94. Id.
95. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 587 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966)).
96. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987).
97. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 298-302 (1978).
98. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 304 (1977).
99. Id. at 305.
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tion.' ' ° However, appeals to normal, healthy sexual desires are not ade-
quate to meet the test.'° Of course, the distinction between "shameful"
and "healthy" is extremely nebulous.'0 2
A work is patently offensive if it deals with hard core sexual conduct
which has been specifically defined by state law.' °3 The Miller Court
offered two model state statutes describing hard core sexual conduct.'°4
A work's conformity with conduct described in the state statute is not
dispositive on the question of whether the particular community would
be patently offended, but it is entitled to significant weight.'0 5 To avoid
prosecutions that are unforeseeable to the defendant, neither juries nor
courts have unbridled discretion in determining what is patently
offensive. '06
Finally, to rise to the level of obscenity the work in question must
lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'07 A work does
not meet the test's third prong if it has serious merit, measured objec-
tively, even if a majority of the community would not agree.'08 In other
words, under this prong a work with slight or moderate artistic merit
would be deemed obscene; once a work is attacked, and the first and
second prongs are satisfied, the work must be serious to receive first
100. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (citing A.L.I., MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957)); see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472
U.S. 491, 498 (1985) (readopting definition).
101. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 591 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing
Brockett, 472 U.S. at 498).
102. See, e.g., Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504-05, in which the Court held that the word "lust" as
a definition of "prurience" should be excised from a Washington statute, because "lust" now is
taken to include a normal interest in sex. Prior to Brockett, the Court had defined prurient as
"material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20. When
Brockett was before the Ninth Circuit, the court noted that an example of the acceptance of
"lust" as healthy and not obscene was shown by President Jimmy Carter's famous comments
about his own lustful thoughts. See J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 490
(9th Cir. 1984) (Prior to his election in 1976, presidential candidate Jimmy Carter confessed he
had "looked on a lot of women with lust [and] . . . committed adultery in [his] heart many
times."), rev'd sub nom. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
103. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See supra note 92.
104. Miller, 413 U.S. at 25. See supra note 92.
105. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 593 (citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291,
307-08 (1977)).
106. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1974) (no reasonable jury could find film
patently offensive that depicted a woman with a bare midriff engaged in what were understood
to be "ultimate sexual acts," when there was no exhibition of the actors' genitals).
107. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 587
(S.D. Fla. 1990).
108. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 594.
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amendment protection.' ° 9 The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable
person would find the required social value in the material at issue, taken
as a whole. "o In Miller, the Court noted that examples of works meeting
the requisite value are "medical books for the education of physicians
and related personnel [which] necessarily use graphic illustrations and
descriptions of human anatomy."'I
C. The Supreme Court's Problems in Defining Obscenity
In the years between the Roth and Miller decisions, the Supreme
Court was entangled in conflicting views and changing tests of what was
obscene and, therefore, without constitutional protection." 2 Justice
Harlan noted that the attempt to separate obscenity from other sexually-
oriented, but constitutionally-protected speech had "produced a variety
of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course
of constitutional adjudication."' Justice Black, Justice Brennan (who
authored the Roth opinion, but later changed his position)" 4 and Justice
Douglas were regular dissenters,' and the Court never held a majority
on an obscenity decision." 6 The Justices, applying their separate tests,
109. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at
587.
110. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
111. Miller, 413 U.S. at 26.
112. The Court's obscenity test between Roth and Miller was announced in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). See supra note 77. Additionally, in the intervening
years, each Justice seemed to follow his own formulation. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 482 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 497
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("hard core" pornography is the limit of both federal and state power);
Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 445 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("social importance" could only "be consid-
ered with evidence that the material in question appeals to prurient interest and is patently
offensive"); id. at 460-62 (White, J., dissenting) (work is obscene only if it appeals to prurient
interest by exceeding customary limits of candor and "social importance" is not an independ-
ent test but within the prurient interest inquiry); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508
(1966) (prurient appeal defined in terms of a deviant sexual group); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 192-95 (1964) (community standards should be national); id. at 196 (Black, J., concur-
ring, joined by Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 200-01 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (community
standards should be local); id. at 204 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (the federal government may
control only "hard core" pornography, while the states have more latitude); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 508, 512-13 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J., dissent-
ing) (the government may not regulate any sexually oriented matter on the ground it is
obscene).
113. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
114. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Roth,
354 U.S. at 479, 485.
115. See, e.g., Paris, 413 U.S. at 70 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Roth, 354 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J., dissenting).
116. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973). Between 1957 and 1973, the Court de-
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resorted to per curiam 117 decisions, summary reversals, or denials of cer-
tiorari in obscenity cases, which only served to further the confusion by
obscuring the Court's rationales.1"8
Miller offered only a slightly altered formulation of the basic Roth
test." 9  Miller, however, left unchanged the underlying approach1
20
which had posed so many problems.' 2' Interestingly, in the development
of the obscenity doctrine, the original rationale behind the doctrine was
negated. '
22
To illustrate, in Roth, obscene material was deemed unprotected
precisely because it lacked even the slightest social worth. 123 The defini-
tion of obscenity as expression utterly lacking social importance was the
key to the conceptual basis of Roth and the Court's subsequent opin-
ions. 124 In the Court's next test, Memoirs, 125 the Court declared a work
unprotected if it was utterly worthless.' 26 Thus, in Memoirs the Roth
rationale became part of the definition of obscenity itself.' 27  In the
present Miller test, the Court reaffirmed the Roth holding that obscene
speech is not protected by the first amendment. 28 Under the third prong
of Miller, however, a work is obscene and thus unprotected if it is with-
out serious worth.1 29 The Miller approach assumes some works will be
deemed obscene - even though they clearly have some social value -
because the party alleging obscenity is able to prove the value is not seri-
ous enough.' 30 Thus, the basis originally established in Roth as to why
obscene speech had no constitutional protection - obscene speech is ut-
terly without social value - no longer exists in light of Miller's third
cided over 30 obscenity cases; yet, over that period, a majority never agreed upon a precise
definition of obscenity. L. TRIBE, supra note 71, § 12-18, at 942 n.90 (quoting The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 156 n.68 (1978)).
117. A per curiam opinion is an opinion "by the court," which expresses its decision in the
case but whose author is not identified. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 327 (1984). It may
represent a brief announcement of the disposition of a case by the court, not accompanied by a
written opinion. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979).
118. Paris, 413 U.S. at 82-83, 93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 83.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 96.
122. Id. at 97.
123. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
124. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
126. Id. at 418.
127. L. TRIBE, supra note 71, § 12-16, at 908-09.
128. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973).
129. Id. at 24.
130. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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prong. 131
Miller is still the law after nearly two decades.' 32 The obscenity
doctrine under Miller nevertheless remains plagued by the vagueness of
undefinable concepts which comprised each obscenity test before it.'
33
The vague components of the test lead courts to draw uncertain lines
between protected and unprotected speech, thus creating a strong possi-
bility of encroaching fundamental first amendment rights.1
34
V. THE REASONING OF THE SKYYWALKER RECORDS COURT
A. The First Miller Inquiry: Appeal to the Prurient Interest
The district court found that, when applying contemporary commu-
nity standards, Nasty's sexually explicit lyrics and song titles met the
level of an appeal to the prurient interest. 35 The court maintained that
its holding was not based on its personal opinion as to Nasty's obscen-
ity.1 36 Yet, the court reached its decision through conclusions which ap-
pear overtly subjective, such as a finding that "[Nasty] is an appeal
directed to 'dirty' thoughts and the loins, not to the intellect and the
mind." I37
The court listed several factors that it considered probative to the
131. See, e.g., id. (The Court's Miller approach requiring serious value "is not merely incon-
sistent with our holding in Roth; it is nothing less than a rejection of the fundamental First
Amendment premises and rationale of the Roth opinion .... ). See also L. TRIBE, supra note
71, § 12-16, at 908-09.
132. The fact that Miller has survived this long is probably more a function of the Court's
changing composition towards conservatism since the most volatile years of the obscenity doc-
trine, rather than a reflection of the Miller test's soundness.
133. See Paris, 413 U.S. at 83-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 84-85. Justice Brennan noted in Paris that
[a]lthough we have assumed that obscenity does exist and that we "know it when
[we] see it," [quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., con-
curring)], we are manifestly unable to describe it in advance except by reference to
concepts so elusive that they fail to distinguish clearly between protected and unpro-
tected speech. We have more than once previously acknowledged that "constitution-
ally protected expression .. . is often separated from obscenity only by a dim and
uncertain line" [quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963)].
Id. at 84.
Fundamental first amendment rights may be encroached, for example, when a publisher
or distributor disseminates material beyond a particular small region. In light of the possibility
of both state and federal prosecution in any locale through which allegedly obscene material
might pass, "the pressure on a publisher or distributor to conform to the lowest common
denominator of sexual acceptability" becomes enormous. L. TRIBE, supra note 71, § 12-16, at
913. This is especially true "since the defendant need not be shown to have realized that his
work was obscene." Id.
135. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 591 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
136. Id. at 590.
137. Id. at 591.
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question of prurience.' 3 ' First, the court gave weight to the fact that
Florida's legislature has codified definitions of obscene sexual conduct. 1
39
The court found that the recording's lyrics and song titles were replete
with sexual references," 40 and that the definitions in the Florida Legisla-
ture obscenity statutes "cover most, if not all, of the sexual acts depicted
in [Nasty]."141
Second, the court found that the frequency and graphic description
of the sexual lyrics evince "a clear intention to lure hearers into this ac-
tivity."' 42 The court likened the vivid descriptions in Nasty to reading a
book or watching a film on this subject. 143 The court found it notewor-
thy that the material at issue was music, and rap music in particular,
which necessarily emphasizes lyrics.'"
The court further gave some weight to the finding that 2 Live Crew
presented Nasty to the public in a manner calculated to make a salacious
appeal. 45 The court found that the title of the recording, the names of
many of the songs, and the illustration on the recording's insert'" fit
within the Supreme Court's definition of materials "look[ing] for titila-
tion [sic]."' 14 ' The court further noted that the difference between sales
138. Id. at 591-92.
139. Id. at 591. The court cites the following sections of the Florida Statutes: section
847.001(11), "which defines 'sexual conduct' to include 'actual or simulated sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual intercourse . . .masturbation, . . . sadomasochistic abuse[, or] actual lewd
exhibition of the genitals;' " section 847.001(2), which "defines deviate sexual intercourse as
sexual conduct between unmarried persons involving contact between the penis and the anus,
the mouth and the penis, or the mouth and the vulva;" and section 847.001(8), which "defines
sadomasochistic abuse as satisfaction from sadistic violence derived by inflicting harm upon
another." Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 591 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
140. See supra note 30.
141. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 591.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 591-92. A court may look to the manner in which a work is distributed and
promoted to determine if the "leer of the sensualist" permeates the work. Skyywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 591 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463, 465-66, 468 (1966)). A court may consider this salacious intent of the
work's creator to find that a work appeals to the prurient interest. Id. at 592 (citing Splawn v.
California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977)).
146. The court did not describe the recording insert in its opinion. The insert should not be
probative evidence, however, in finding that 2 Live Crew commercially exploited sex. The
court noted the rationale behind considering commercial exploitation of sex as "tend[ing] to
force public confrontation with the potentially offensive aspects of the work." Id. at 593 (quot-
ing Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 470). The insert to a recording cannot be viewed accidentally by the
public at large, forcing exposure to the offensive matter. The insert is contained inside the
recording's packaging and may only be seen when the recording has been purchased and
unsealed.
147. Id. at 592 (quoting Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 470).
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of Nasty and the non-explicit alternative, As Clean As They Wanna Be, 4 '
evidenced that 2 Live Crew's release of Nasty was motivated by the "leer
of the sensualist." 1
49
B. The Second Miller Inquiry: Patently Offensive
Not all speech with sex as its topic is obscene.'° The district court
found, however, that under contemporary community standards, the
Nasty recording was another matter.' 51 The court found Nasty patently
offensive for the same reasons it determined that the recording appealed
to the prurient interest: it depicts sexual conduct with frequency and in
graphic detail,' 5 2 and its contents are within the realm of Florida's ob-
scenity statutes. 5 3 The court noted that the relevant Florida statutes
were drafted similarly to proposed state statutes proffered in Miller for
defining hard core obscenity. 54
While the district court determined that the above factors suffi-
ciently established that Nasty is patently offensive, it cited additional fac-
tors that supported its finding.' 55 First, the court considered Nasty's
"dirty words" and "depictions of female abuse," coupled with explicit
sexual descriptions.5 6 Second, the court noted that because Nasty is mu-
sic, the recording has the potential to intrude on unwilling listeners since
it must be played to be experienced.' The court concluded that while
the law requires citizens to avert their ears when public speech is merely
offensive, ' the law protects them from public obscenity that has been
148. See supra text accompanying notes 31 & 33-34.
149. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 591-92 (quoting Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 465-66,
468, 475-76).
150. Id at 592. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
151. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 592 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
152. Id. See supra note 30.
153. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 593. For an explanation of the applicable stat-
utes, see supra note 139.
154. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 591, 592-93. See supra note 92 for a description
of Miller's proffered state statutes. See supra note 139 for an explanation of the Florida ob-
scenity statutes.
155. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 593.
156. Id. The opinion does not contain any lyrics from the Nasty recording. See supra note
30. However, the court stated that the specificity of the graphic sexual descriptions "makes
the audio message analogous to a camera with a zoom lens, focusing on the sights and sounds
of various ultimate sexual acts." Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 592
(S.D. Fla. 1990).
157. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 593. There was no evidence, however, that any
unwilling listener had been subjected to Nasty. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
158. The court does not cite authority for this proposition. Skyywalker Records, 739 F.
Supp. at 593.
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defined by state legislation."5 9 Finally, the court again considered the
finding that 2 Live Crew commercially exploited sex to promote sales.
160
C. The Third Miller Inquiry: Social Value
The Skyywalker Records court found that, based upon a reasonable
person standard, the Nasty recording has no serious social value. 6 ' The
court refuted the contention of 2 Live Crew's witness, Professor Carlton
Long, an expert on the culture of African-Americans, that the recording
has serious sociological, political, and literary value.' 62 The court also
concluded that the recording lacks serious artistic value, as comedy and
satire, and lacks overall social value.'
63
First, Professor Long testified that Nasty has political content
64
However, the court found that even if the passages cited by Long have
political meaning, they are too isolated to give the entire recording seri-
ous political value.'16  Next, Professor Long testified that since Nasty re-
flects the group members' African-American heritage, it has sociological
value.' 66 Professor Long identified three cultural devices evident in the
work to support his claim: (1) "call and response;" (2) "doing the doz-
ens," a word game composed of a series of insults escalating in satirical
content; and (3) "boasting."' 167 The court determined that these devices
either do not exist in the recording or, where they do exist, are found in
other cultures besides that of African-Americans and thus are not of seri-
ous sociological importance.' 68  Finally, Professor Long testified that
Nasty has literary value through the use of literary devices such as
rhyme, allusion, and personification. 169 The court considered this con-
159. Id. The court supports this idea with the fact that a person lying on a public beach,
sitting in a public park, walking down the street, or sitting in his automobile waiting for the
light to change is essentially a captive audience to music playing around him. Id. However,
there is no evidence of any such incidents in this case. See supra note 53 and accompanying
text. Rather, the case concerns only whether Nasty in itself is obscene and thus whether its
sale to a willing adult may be banned. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 582-83.
160. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 593. Commercial exploitation of sex to promote
sales is a factor that may be considered in evaluating whether, in addition to prurient appeal, a
work is patently offensive. Id. (citing Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1973)).
See supra note 145.
161. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 594-96 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
162. Id. at 594-95.
163. Id. at 595-96.
164. Id. at 594.
165. Id
166. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 594 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 594-95.
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tention "nonsense regardless of the expert's credentials," and noted the
Miller Court's statement that "[a] quotation from Voltaire in the fly leaf
of a book will not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene
publication."'
170
The court also found that the recording lacks serious artistic value
as comedy and satire. 171 The court explained that the initial laughter
Nasty inspired when played in the courtroom could have reflected embar-
rassment, shame, and the nervous release of tension, as well as humor. 1
72
The court found that laughter was heard only when the recording's first
song was played and considered this probative in finding that the
audience's reaction was for the former reasons. 173 Finally, the district
court determined that Nasty has no overall social value because, once the
"riffs" - samples from pre-recorded music borrowed from outside
sources - are removed, the recording consists only of valueless rhythm
and sexual lyrics.' 74 Therefore, the court concluded that the Nasty re-
cording is legally obscene.'
75
VI. THE MILLER TEST IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, LEADING
TO FAULTY APPLICATIONS LIKE SKYYWALKER RECORDS
A. Overview
The Miller test is composed of such vague components that it ap-
pears to violate the first amendment under the vagueness doctrine. 176 A
judicial doctrine becomes unconstitutional when citizens cannot under-
stand and apply the doctrine with enough certainty to know, in advance
of prosecution and conviction, whether their conduct is illegal.1 77 Such
vagueness results both in criminal convictions and civil judgments that
170. Id. at 595.
171. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 595 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 595-96.
175. Id. at 596.
176. The vagueness doctrine, as applied to Miller, was discussed in Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83-93 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that all criminal laws
provide fair notice of "what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453 (1939). The Court has repeatedly held that the definition of obscenity must
provide adequate notice of exactly what is prohibited from dissemination. Paris, 413 U.S. at
86-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948)).
Skyywalker Records was a civil action, and thus 2 Live Crew was not subject to convic-
tion. As a result of the court's ruling, however, any person possessing, selling, distributing, or
producing Nasty may be convicted. See supra note 40. Moreover, although the Sheriff's Office
in this case chose the route of seizing the recording rather than pressing criminal charges, the
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the defendant had no reason to know could occur,' and the "chill" of
legitimate speech that the speaker fears may, after the fact, be deemed
illegal. 79 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the Consti-
tution "requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with suffi-
cient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement."18
0
Under the Miller test, the line between protected and unprotected
speech is dependent upon indefinite concepts such as "prurient interest,"
"patently offensive," "sexual conduct," and "serious value."'' Publish-
ers, filmmakers, museum curators, or record retailers must interpret for
themselves the meaning of such phrases. 8 2 The standard is further com-
argument against vague criminal tests is still valid, for 2 Live Crew was and still is open to
criminal prosecution for Nasty's obscenity.
178. Paris, 413 U.S. at 87-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Paris, Justice Brennan found that
even the most painstaking efforts to determine in advance whether certain sexually
oriented expression is obscene must inevitably prove unavailing. For the insuffi-
ciency of the notice compels persons to guess not only whether their conduct is cov-
ered by a criminal statute, but also whether their conduct falls within the
constitutionally permissible reach of the statute. The resulting level of uncertainty is
utterly intolerable, not alone because it makes [for example] bookselling ... a haz-
ardous profession, but as well because it invites arbitrary and erratic enforcement of
the law.
Id. (citation omitted). Justice Brennan concluded,
I know of no satisfactory answer to the assertion by ... Justice Black [in Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1966) (dissenting)], "after the fourteen separate
opinions handed down" . . . in 1966, that "no person, not even the most learned
judge much less a layman, is capable of knowing in advance of an ultimate decision
in his particular case by this Court whether certain material comes within the area of
'obscenity.'"
Id. at 87.
179. For example, the Supreme Court
has emphasized that the "vice of vagueness" is especially pernicious where legislative
power over an area involving speech, press, petition and assembly is involved ....
For a statute broad enough to support infringement of speech, writings, thoughts and
public assemblies, against the unequivocal command of the First Amendment neces-
sarily leaves all persons to guess just what the law really means to cover, and fear of a
wrong guess inevitably leads people to forego the very rights the Constitution sought
to protect above all others.
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
180. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). See also United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, 617 (1954). The Court has been especially intolerant of vague statutes in the first
amendment area. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 567, 573 (1974) (phrase in statute
prohibiting acts which "treat[ ] contemptuously" the American flag held unconstitutionally
vague and overly broad); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (school
anti-noise ordinance not overbroad since expressive activity is prohibited only if it is an actual,
or imminent, and willful interference that materially disrupts normal classwork).
181. Miller v. California, 739 F. Supp. 15, 24 (1973). See supra text accompanying notes
83-111.
182. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 86-88 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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plicated because the obscenity of a particular item may depend on nu-
ances of presentation,183 the context of its dissemination,184 or the
defendant's "pandering."' 85 Additionally, the problems inherent to deci-
phering and applying "contemporary community standards"'8 6 illustrate
the vagueness of the test. Must the party holding the burden of proof
present evidence of this standard? Or is the court able to draw solely
upon its own experience within the community? Is it relevant that the
plaintiffs claim their work reflects the experiences of and is directed at a
particular racial group?
In the present case, the district court's analysis fails because it is
based upon a faulty application of the Miller test. The vagueness of the
community standards requirement in the first two prongs left the door
open for the court to incorrectly apply Miller.
B. Application of Miller in Skyywalker Records
1. Sheriff Navarro Should Have Been Required to Submit Evidence
of the Contemporary Community Standard
The Supreme Court has never held that the party with the burden of
proof on a work's obscenity must present evidence of the relevant com-
munity standard." 7 The Court has expressly noted a caveat, however, to
the principle that expert evidence in obscenity cases is not required. 8 8
This caveat, which notes that lack of expert testimony would be "plainly
inadequate" when the standards of the relevant community are outside
the trier of fact's knowledge,' 89 appears to apply in Skyywalker
Records. '90
In the present case, a bench trial was held,' 9' and 2 Live Crew ar-
183. Id. at 84 (citing Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475 (1966)).
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)). See L. TRIBE, supra note 71,
§ 12-16, at 911 n.53 (identifying pandering is vague and subjective, and there exists no objec-
tively determinate criteria; in Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 470, where the Court detected the "leer of
the sensualist" and convicted the appellant, other commentators saw only "the giggling of the
college sophomore"). See supra notes 145 & 160 and accompanying text.
186. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
187. L. TRIBE, supra note 71, § 12-16, at 911-12.
188. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 & n.6 (1973).
189. Id. at 56 n.6.
190. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
191. The court denied 2 Live Crew's request for a jury trial for several reasons. First, 2
Live Crew "filed this action in federal court and only requested equitable relief without any
right to a trial by jury. Second, there is no Constitutional right to trial by jury in obscenity
cases. Finally, neither party agreed to trial by jury." 2 Live Crew conditioned its assent to a
jury trial upon the court's favorable ruling on another motion before the court, which was not
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gued that the work was directed to a community outside the individual
judge's knowledge.'92 In this factual setting, the community standard is
a genuine issue and presentation of evidence of the community standard
should thus be required. Since Sheriff Navarro bore the burden of proof
on the question of Nasty's obscenity,' 93 he should have been required to
submit evidence on the relevant community standard, a crucial compo-
nent of proving an obscenity claim.' 94 Instead, Sheriff Navarro, as well
as 2 Live Crew, failed to present any evidence on the community stan-
dard in the relevant community of Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach
counties.' 95 A court should not find Miller satisfied absent this evidence.
However, the district court claimed that Sheriff Navarro's failure to
provide the evidence did not defeat the state's case. 196 The court relied
on Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 19' ("Paris") for the proposition that
the law does not require expert testimony in an obscenity case and that
the alleged obscene material "can and does speak for itself."'9" A close
reading of Paris suggests that the court's reliance is misplaced. The Paris
Court actually held that expert testimony that material is obscene is not
necessary when the material itself is placed into evidence.' 99 This hold-
ing thus applies to the issue of whether an expert should offer an opinion
on a work's obscenity or whether the work should be examined first-
hand.2 "° The instant case presents a different question since the stan-
dards of the community are at issue.2"'
Moreover, the Paris Court expressly declined to consider the neces-
sity of expert testimony in cases where the trier of fact's experience
would be inadequate to judge the material.2"2 The Paris Court noted
granted. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 590 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (cita-
tion omitted).
192. 2 Live Crew's expert witness testified that the Nasty recording was a product of and
directed at the African-American community. Id. at 594. The expert witness testified that he
believed "white Americans 'hear' the Nasty recording in a different way than [African-]Ameri-
cans because of their different frames of references." Id. Further, 2 Live Crew argued that the
court's opinion would not reflect the relevant community standard, but only the personal opin-
ion of the court. Id. at 590.
193. Id. at 582.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 83-106 (the relevant community standard is an
essential component of the first two of the three necessary prongs of the Miller test).
195. Skyywalker Records 739 F. Supp. at 588.
196. Id. at 590.
197. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
198. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 590 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 & n.6 (1973)).
199. Paris, 413 U.S. at 56.
200. See id.
201. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
202. Paris, 413 U.S. at 56 n.6.
[Vol. I11
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
that expert testimony is usually admitted to explain to lay jurors what
they otherwise could not understand.2"3 The Court declined to decide
whether expert testimony would be necessary in a situation where mate-
rial was directed at a group outside the realm of experience of the trier of
fact.2" Part of 2 Live Crew's claim in the present case rests on the no-
tion that Nasty was directed to and appealed to the African-American
community, of which 2 Live Crew contended the court did not have sig-
nificant personal knowledge.2"5 Thus, this case potentially presents the
kind of question to which the Paris Court expressly noted its holding did
not apply. 2°
The need for evidence of the community standard is especially clear
in cases such as Skyywalker Records, where a court, rather than a jury,
will determine if the material is obscene.20 7 Whereas the standard of the
community can be thought to be relatively more ascertainable in the
hands of a random cross-section of the community - the jury - the
community standard becomes more elusive when a single person must
define it. This problem is compounded when the single judge is not a
member of the community to which the plaintiffs allege their work is
directed.208 Thus, since this was a bench trial and 2 Live Crew argued its
work is directed to a special community, evidence presented on the com-
munity standard by the party holding the burden of proof - Sheriff
Navarro - should have been required.
203. Id. (citing 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 556, 559 (3d ed. 1940)).
204. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973).
205. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 478, 594, 590 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See
supra note 192.
206. The Paris Court stated that the type of group of which the trier of fact would have no
knowledge would be "a bizarre, deviant group." 413 U.S. at 56 n.6. However, there of course
will be groups outside the trier of fact's experience which are not necessarily bizarre and devi-
ant. The court's reference to cases outside the trier of fact's realm only makes sense if it
consists of this broader group, which could include a racial community different from that of
the trier of fact's.
207. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 590.
208. Id. at 590, 594. See supra note 192.
The words that the Court... find so unpalatable may be the stuff of everyday con-
versations in some, if not many, of the innumerable subcultures that compose this
Nation .... As one researcher concluded, "[w]ords generally considered obscene...
are considered neither obscene nor derogatory in the [black] vernacular except in
particular contextual situations and when used with certain intonations."
Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Constitutional law scholar Laurence H. Tribe notes that in Pacifica, id. at 775,
Justice Brennan correctly viewed the Court's contrary approach when defining indecency as
reflecting "acute ethnocentri[sm]," the product of a "depressing inability to appreciate that in
our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk differently from the
Members of [the] Court, and who do not share their fragile sensibilities." L. TRIBE, supra note
71, § 12-18, at 942-43.
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2. The Court Did Not Apply Its Finding of the
Community Standard
Even if Sheriff Navarro's failure to provide community standard evi-
dence should not defeat the state's case, the district court incorrectly sup-
plemented this missing evidence with the court's own "knowledge" of the
community standard. °9 Further, the court erroneously failed to apply
this community standard in its opinion.210 These deficiencies violate the
requirements of the Miller test.
211
The district court found that since the parties failed to provide the
evidence, the court, as the finder of fact, must rely upon its personal
knowledge of the community standard.21 2 Paradoxically, the court
stressed the fact that its decision was not based upon its personal opin-
213ion. Instead, the court asserted that it had sufficient personal knowl-
edge of the community and its standards to make a decision in this
case.214 The court was confident that it could successfully walk the line
between the unacceptable use of its personal opinion and the acceptable
use of its personal knowledge.215 The opinion does not reflect, however,
that this difference came into play.216 The court's reasoning does not
indicate where, if at all, its findings were based on an application of a
community standard.217
To illustrate, the district court concluded that the three counties had
"a more tolerant view of obscene speech than would other communities
within the state. '21 8 The court refused, however, to label the commu-
nity's standard as "tolerant per se."'21 9 The court did not define either
standard nor indicate how they differ.22° In the abstract, this differentia-
tion has little substance.
Moreover, the differentiation becomes meaningless because the
court never referred to either, or in fact any, standard within its analysis
of the Miller elements.22' Under a proper application of Miller, the first
two prongs of Miller must be analyzed under the relevant community
209. See infra text accompanying notes 212-27.
210. See Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. 478, 591-93 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
211. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
212. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 588.
213. Id. at 590.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 591-93.
217. See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 591-93 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
218. Id. at 589 (emphasis in original).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 591-93.
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standard.222 This application is essential to satisfy Miller.223 Here, how-
ever, the court never analyzed the various findings, which it points to as
probative,224 in light of the alleged "more tolerant" but not "tolerant per
se" standard.225 Without analytical support, the court's mere labeling of
the community standard as such is an empty exercise.
Although the court claimed its personal opinion of the community
standard played no part, the court's failure to apply the facts to a specific
community standard in order to reach its conclusions indicates other-
wise. Due to this failure, the court's analysis does not comply with the
Supreme Court's test in Miller. Miller mandates that the relevant com-
munity be made up of all adults in the area,226 not one judge, and that
the questions of "appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness...
are issues of fact for the jury [or judge] to determine applying contempo-
rary community standards.
227
VII. ANY OBSCENITY DOCTRINE DIRECTED AT WILLING ADULTS
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A. Overview
On a more basic level, Miller and any obscenity doctrine which
measures the suitability of speech - absent evidence of exposure to
young children and unwilling adults - appears to be unconstitutional on
its face. The doctrine itself defies basic precepts of the first amendment,
regardless of how it is applied by a court. The Miller test needs rethink-
ing because it leads to the encroachment of first amendment rights for a
large body of expressions that may not be popular with, or tasteful to, all,
yet should be in the "market place of ideas."t
228
B. Finding Serious Social Value is Intrinsically Vague
The basic unconstitutionality of Miller, or any obscenity doctrine,
can be seen in the unconstitutionally strict third prong of the Miller
test.229 The third prong calls for analysis under the reasonable person
standard.230 Unlike the purely objective use of this standard in tort
222. See supra text accompanying notes 83-106.
223. Id.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 135-60.
225. See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 591-93 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
226. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1978).
227. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987) (emphasis added).
228. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined
by Brandeis, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 1.
229. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
230. Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01.
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law,231 evaluating the extent of a work's literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value can only reflect one's subjective, personal opinion; a gauge
which is impermissibly vague.232 It is illogical that a "reasonable per-
son" conclusion could be reached when critiquing artistic works, in the
same manner that courts determine a "reasonable person's" level of
safety precautions or due care. Like art, film, and literature, music re-
flects personal tastes, and "tastes... are hardly reducible to precise defi-
nitions . . . . For matters of taste, like matters of belief, turn on the
idiosyncrasies of individuals." '233
In contrast to the third prong of Miller, over forty years ago the
Supreme Court recognized that "[w]hat seems to one to be trash may
have for others fleeting or even enduring values., 234 The Court stated
that
[u]nder our system of government there is an accommodation
for the widest varieties of tastes and ideas. What is good litera-
ture, what has educational value, what is refined public infor-
mation, what is good art, varies with individuals as it does from
one generation to another .... From the multitude of compet-
ing offerings the public will pick and choose.235
Years later, the Court again contradicted Miller's third prong when it
found that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is
largely because government officials cannot make principled distinctions
in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so
largely to the individual." '236
More recently, Justice Scalia echoed this idea in his concurring
opinion in Pope v. Illinois237 ("Pope"): "it is quite impossible to come to
an objective assessment of (at least) literary or artistic value, there being
many accomplished people who have found literature in Dada,[238 ] and
art in the replication of a soup can."'2 39 Although Pope addressed only
the narrow issue of Miller's reasonable person standard and thus Miller
as a whole was not before the Court,2" Justice Scalia indicated that if
231. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th ed. 1984).
232. Vague criminal statutes unconstitutionally result in unforeseeable punishments and
chill legitimate speech. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
233. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
234. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 158 (1946).
235. Id. at 157-58 (footnote deleted).
236. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
237. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
238. Dada is an art movement which began in Europe in the early twentieth century. S.
WILSON, TATE GALLERY - AN ILLUSTRATED COMPANION 157 (1989).
239. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 500-01.
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given the opportunity, he might overrule Miller because "we would be
better advised to adopt as a legal maxim what has long been the wisdom
of mankind: De gustibus non est disputandum. Just as there is no use
arguing about taste, there is no use litigating about it."
'241
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Pope, illuminated the vagueness of the
third Miller prong:
The problem with this formulation is that it assumes that all
reasonable persons would resolve the value inquiry in the same
way. In fact, there are many cases in which some reasonable
people would find that specific sexually oriented materials have
serious artistic, political, literary, or scientific value, while other
reasonable people would conclude that they have no such
value. The Court's formulation does not tell the jury how to
decide such cases.242
In Skyywalker Records, the court decided that no reasonable person
could find serious social value in the Nasty recording.2 4 3 In contrast, a
professor of African-American culture testified to the serious political,
literary, and sociological value which he saw in the recording. 2" Un-
doubtedly, some of the over two million people who have purchased the
recording have arrived at one of each of these views. Many others have
probably arrived at the myriad of other possible interpretations of the
recording, including 2 Live Crew's argument that Nasty's crudity is
comedic.
245
In sum, one "right" conclusion to the third prong of Miller seems
impossible. If this kind of determination is indeed impossible, any con-
clusion under the third prong is basically an arbitrary decision.246 When
a court finds that the requirements of Miller have been satisfied, arbitrary
and thus unconstitutional punishments are subsequently meted.2 47
C. Miller Contradicts Prior Supreme Court Holdings
1. The First Amendment Protects Inexpressible Emotion
Nowhere in the text of the Constitution, or in its history until
241. Id. at 505.
242. Id. at 511 (emphasis in original) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 593, 596 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
244. Id. at 594-95.
245. For example, in 2 Live Crew's trial for giving an allegedly obscene nightclub perform-
ance, see supra note 28, the jurors, before acquitting the group, were so amused that they
requested permission from the judge to laugh during the proceedings. Stengel, Best of '90,
TIME, Dec. 31, 1990, at 61.
246. See supra note 178.
247. Id.
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Miller, has speech and expression needed to be "serious" to receive first
amendment protection.248 In fact, first amendment protection has al-
ways been based upon the opposite idea:249 thoughts, speech, and expres-
sion need not undergo the scrutiny of their appeal to "the intellect and
the mind."' 25° By requiring serious value, the third prong of Miller seems
to directly contradict a constitutional right recognized by the Supreme
Court: the protection of inexpressible emotions.
25'
The Supreme Court has expressly found that the first amendment
protects undefinable emotive speech as well as speech with a definable
intellectual content.25 2 Justice Harlan recognized in Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 211 ("Cohen") that expression "conveys not only ideas capable of rel-
atively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well.", 254 In holding that the act of wearing a jacket bearing
the words "Fuck the Draft" into a courthouse corridor was constitution-
ally protected, Justice Harlan's opinion "implicitly rejected the ... di-
chotomy between reason and desire that so often constricts the reach of
the first amendment.
255
The first amendment protection of inexpressible emotions an-
nounced in Cohen seems to preclude a seriousness inquiry. If a work
were truly undefinable and inexpressible, then to weigh its value at all,
whether slight, moderate, or serious, would be impossible. Thus, if the
first amendment protects inexpressible emotions, it seems unconstitu-
tional to require a given expression to have seriousness.
The Cohen Court went further and defended the "constitutional
right of free expression" as
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely
into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such free-
dom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more
248. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971); Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949). In Stanley,
the Court held that a state's effort to control the moral content of a person's thoughts "is
wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment." Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-
66. The Court found it "firjrelevant that obscene materials in general, or [a particular work]
... before the Court, are arguably devoid of any ideological content." Id. at 566 (emphasis
added).
249. Paris, 413 U.S. at 97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25-26;
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-66; Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4-5.
250. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 591 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
251. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
252. Id.
253. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
254. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
255. L. TRIBE, supra note 71, § 12-1, at 787-88.
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perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests.25 6
In contrast, neither Miller nor any obscenity doctrine looks to the
individual and the value of preserving the individual's right to voice
ideas.257 Rather, Miller considers how that expression will be received
by others - that is, whether those in the relevant community will be
offended.258 In the present case, there was no evidence that children or
unwilling adults were exposed to the Nasty recording. 259 Therefore, the
focus here on those receiving the material relates only to willing adults
and whether the work is unsuitable for these consenting adults.2 6° When
no possibility of injury through exposure to an innocent party exists, the
above inquiry and the conclusion reached in Skyywalker Records does
not square with the Supreme Court's first amendment theory in Cohen of
choice and opportunity for free decision.
2. The First Amendment Allows Obscene Speech to be
Received and Possessed
The Miller test is also at odds with the Supreme Court's decision in
Stanley v. Georgia261 ("Stanley"), in which the Court recognized the
constitutionally protected right to receive and possess obscene mate-
rial.262 In Stanley, the appellant's home was searched for evidence of his
alleged bookmaking activities.263 In the course of the search, Georgia
officers found films that were later deemed to be obscene. 2' The appel-
lant was tried and convicted for possession of obscene matter, in viola-
tion of Georgia law.265
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case,
finding that the first amendment prohibited making mere possession of
obscene material a crime.266 The Court held that "the Constitution pro-
tects the right to receive information and ideas," and that "[t]his right to
256. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
257. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
258. Id.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
260. Id
261. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
262. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
263. Id at 558.
264. Id
265. Id. at 558-59. Appellant was convicted of "knowingly hav[ing] possession of... ob-
scene matter," in violation of section 26-6301 of the Georgia Code. Id. at 558-59 & 558 n. I
(citing Georgia Code Annotated (Supp. 1968)).
266. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568.
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receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, . . is fun-
damental to our free society." '267 The Court reasoned that the state's
interest constituted only the weak interest of "protect[ing] the individ-
ual's mind from the effects of obscenity." '268 The individual's interest was
the directly contrary and much stronger interest of not having his
thoughts controlled by the government.269 The Court found that,
[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men's minds.2
The Skyywalker Records decision makes it illegal to possess, sell,
distribute, or produce the Nasty recording because, like the films in Stan-
ley, the recording is obscene under state law. 27' Although the
Skyywalker Records holding involved a declaratory judgment of Nasty's
obscenity,272 criminal proceedings may nevertheless be instigated under
the decision for any of the above violations.27 a One Ft. Lauderdale, Flor-
ida record store owner has already been convicted for having sold Nasty
after the Skyywalker Records court found it obscene.274
The Stanley Court distinguished Roth v. United States,275 stating
that Roth involved governmental power to prohibit or regulate certain
public activities involving obscene matter, whereas Stanley involved pri-
vate possession of obscene material.276 Arguably, a court could attempt
to distinguish Skyywalker Records with the same reasoning.277 However,
the individual and state interests that the Stanley Court held to weigh so
heavily in favor of the individual remain the same in either situation. Is
it possible that we have the constitutional right to receive or possess ideas
without regard to their social worth, yet we cannot legally disseminate
267. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 565.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See supra note 40.
272. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
273. See supra note 40.
274. For details of Charles Freeman's conviction, see supra note 27.
275. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text for a brief descrip-
tion of the Roth case.
276. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 560-64 (1969).
277. See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 582-83 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(Skyywalker Records involved the public sale of Nasty and its suppression by the Broward
County Sheriff).
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these ideas to a willing adult recipient?278 As Justice Stevens summa-
rized the situation, it is "somewhat illogical ... that a person may be
prosecuted criminally for providing another with material he has a con-
stitutional right to possess. "279
Further, the discrepancy between cases such as Stanley, where re-
ceipt or possession of obscene films in the privacy of one's home is consti-
tutionally protected, 280 and Skyywalker Records, where possession, sale,
distribution, or production of the Nasty recording has no protection,
281
can only be viewed as arbitrary. Constitutional law scholar Laurence H.
Tribe has noted that because the line between sexually-oriented, but con-
stitutionally-protected speech and unprotected, obscene speech is impos-
sible to draw, there is "grossly disparate treatment of similar
offenders. ' 282 Tribe notes that
the Court has retreated to a posture in which the erotic tastes of
the educated and well bred emerge as part of the "grand con-
ception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the
historic struggle for freedom," while the less fashionable eroti-
cism of the masses becomes the mere subject of "commercial
exploitation of obscene material.,
28 3
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Skyywalker Records decision illustrates how nebulous the appli-
cation of the Miller obscenity test is. With concepts so vague and objec-
tively undefinable to work with, courts are left to make arbitrary
distinctions of what will be judged obscene, and thus illegal. In
Skyywalker Records, the court isolated a crucial component of two of the
three required prongs of Miller - the relevant community standard -
and: (1) defined the standard itself without any requirement that the
party bearing the burden of proof make an evidentiary showing of the
278. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 85, 86 n.9. (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
279. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
280. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564, 568.
281. Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 585, 596.
282. L. TRIBE, supra note 71, § 12-16, at 919 (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 198 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
283. Id. at 918 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973)). See also Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring) ("It is not the [material]
that is on trial; it is a person. The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the
obscenity of a book or picture. The nature of the materials is, of course, relevant as an attri-
bute of the defendant's conduct, but the materials are thus placed in context from which they
draw color and character.").
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standard;284 and (2) failed to apply the standard in its analysis as Miller
mandates.28 On a broader level, regardless of how a court applies
Miller, the test itself seems to violate the precepts of the first amendment
and the Supreme Court's past constructions of it.
28 6
The Skyywalker Records court noted that the court's role "is not to
serve as a censor or an art and music critic, '287 yet the court held that
"the law does not call [the Nasty recording] art - it calls it obscenity[,]
• . . a crime in Florida. ' 2 8 Miller is in fact an inquiry into the artistic
value of a work, and the court necessarily serves as a critic of the given
art, music, or film. When the work does not rise to the level of a "seri-
ous" piece, and the first two prongs of Miller have been met, the work is
deemed legally obscene.2 9 In Florida, the distribution, sale, production,
or mere possession of the work then becomes a criminal offense. 290 This
indeed is censorship.
It is time for a reappraisal of Miller as well as the notion of any
obscenity doctrine that prohibits what some may term obscene speech, in
the absence of exposure to young children or unwilling adults. The his-
tory of the obscenity doctrine demonstrates that it is simply impossible to
create an objective obscenity standard that complies with the first amend-
ment.29' Recognizing this, the Supreme Court should reaffirm the first
amendment's unconditional guarantee of free speech in cases involving
consenting adults' access to allegedly obscene works - regardless of the
extent of the work's value to the temporary occupant of the jury box or
judge's bench.
An obscenity formulation would still be needed for judicial determi-
nation of cases where offensive speech was intentionally directed at un-
willing adults or young children. This test would continue to face the
many problems inherent in restricting the content of speech and would
remain difficult to reconcile with the first amendment.29 2 It is only in
this narrow instance, however, that the governmental interest of control-
ling the moral content of men's thoughts carries any real weight.29 ' The
usually countervailing weight of the individual's right to freedom of
284. See supra text accompanying notes 187-227.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 210-27.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 228-83.
287. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 594 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
288. Id. at 596.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 585.
291. See, e.g., supra notes 178-79.
292. See id.
293. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969).
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thought and ideas2 94 no longer exists in the narrow circumstance where a
person who does not wish to be exposed to these ideas is forced to do so,
or a child young enough to be deemed needy of particular protection, is
involved.2 95 Moreover, limiting the scope of an obscenity inquiry to only
intentional dissemination of ideas to these groups would further safe-
guard against unforeseeable punishments and the chilling of legitimate
speech.
Further, the increasingly conservative political shift in this country
augments the need to reconsider Miller. More politicians are using ob-
scenity prosecutions as political tools. 2 96 The results of such prosecu-
tions are criminal convictions and civil judgments based on largely
arbitrary and subjective criteria.2 97 With the growing use of the RICO
statute in obscenity prosecutions,2 9 the stakes are higher than ever for
those whose work fails an obscenity inquiry. RICO exacts extreme pun-
ishments: a conviction provides for a twenty-year prison term for each
racketeering count and can force defendants to forfeit their entire enter-
prise, 2 9 9 even if the portion of earnings that came from illegal activities is
as little as $105. 30 In the current political climate, the necessity for a
timely reconsideration of Miller is greater than ever.
Heather C. Beatty
294. Id.
295. See id.
296. Nat'l L.J., June 4, 1990, at 27, col. 1.
297. See supra note 178.
298. L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1990, § F, at 1, col 4.
299. Id. at 6, col. 1-2. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
300. L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1990, § F, at 6, col. 2. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying
text.
1991]
